We propose a 2-party UC-secure protocol that can compute any function securely. The protocol requires only two messages, communication that is poly-logarithmic in the size of the circuit description of the function, and the workload for one of the parties is also only poly-logarithmic in the size of the circuit. This implies, for instance, delegatable computation that requires no expensive off-line phase and remains secure even if the server learns whether the client accepts its results. To achieve this, we define two new notions of extractable hash functions, propose an instantiation based on the knowledge of exponent in an RSA group, and build succinct zero-knowledge arguments in the CRS model.
A notable observation about these works is that the overall workload of the parties is somewhat balanced and is (at least) equivalent to the amount of work that has to be put in evaluating the specified circuit. More specifically, these constructions are appropriate for settings in which the amount of resources allocated for both devices running the protocol is essentially the same, and offer no solution for "asymmetric settings" in which one of the devices is strictly (computationally) weaker than the other (e.g., smartcards, mobile devices). In this paper we will be interested in solutions for such asymmetric settings, so we want to minimize the workload for one of the parties.
If one is willing to assume only honest-but-curious attacks then fully homomorphic encryption [Gen09, BV11a] can be used to design a simple one round protocol with sublinear communication complexity. Here one party, say P 1 , sends its encrypted input to party P 2 , who uses the homomorphic property to compute ciphertexts that contain the output of the specified circuit when evaluated on P 1 's (encrypted) input and his own private input. These ciphertexts are sent to P 1 who can decrypt and learn the result. Obviously, this solution breaks down under malicious attacks. The obvious solution is to have P 2 give non-interactive zeroknowledge proof (NIZK) that his response is correct, but this will not solve our problem. Even though such a proof can be made very short [Gro11] , P 1 would have to work as hard as P 2 to heck the NIZK, and hence the computational complexity for both parties would be linear in the circuit description of the function to compute. This does not fit our scenario where we want to minimize the work for one party, and in any case it seems unsatisfactory that we go from a honest-but-curious solution, where only one party has to evaluate the function, to a protocol where both parties must do it. There seems to be no compelling reason why having security against malicious attacks should force us to do this.
To get a solution where the work for one party is minimized, one needs a protocol by which a prover can give a short zero-knowledge argument for an NP statement, where the verifier only needs to do a small amount of work. More precisely, the amount of work needed for the verifier is polynomial in the security parameter and the size of the statement but only poly-logarithmic in the time needed to check a witness in the standard way. Such proofs or arguments are usually called succinct. The history of such protocols starts with the work of Kilian [Kil92] who suggested the idea of having the prover commit to a PCP for the statement in question using a Merkle hash tree, and then have the verifier (obliviously) check selected bits from the PCP. This protocol is succinct and zero-knowledge but requires several rounds and so cannot be used towards our goal of a 2-message protocol. Subsequent work in this direction has concentrated on protocols where only a succinct non-interactive argument (and not zero-knowedge) is required. This is known as a SNARG. Micali [Mic00] suggested one-message solution based on Kilian's protocol and the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. In [ABOR00] Aiello at al. suggested a two-message protocol where the verifier accesses bits of the PCP via a private information retrieval scheme (PIR). In such a scheme a client can retrieve an entry in a database held by a server without the server learning which entry was accessed. It seems intuitively appealing that if the prover does not know which bits of the PCP the verifier is looking at, soundness of the PCP should imply soundness of the overall argument. However, it was shown in [DLN + 04] that this intuition is not sound unless the prover is committed to one single PCP string. To solve this problem, Di Crescenzo and Lipmaa [CL08] suggested using as commitment the root of a Merkle tree as in Kilian's protocol, but to prove security, they made a very strong type of extractability assumption saying essentially that the fact that the prover outputs the root of the hash tree already implies that one can extract an entire PCP from the prover.
Our Contribution
Compared to the work on SNARGs just discussed, our work makes two contributions: first, we show how to achieve simulation based privacy also for the prover, even if the verifier is malicious. We need this since our goal is UC-secure 2-party computation and we must have privacy for both parties, even under malicious attacks. This is the reason we need a set-up assumption allowing parties to give non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of their inputs. Also, to get a zero-knowledge SNARG, we do not use the PCP+PIR approach from earlier work for a general PIR, instead we build a PIR-like scheme based on FHE, allowing the prover to compute NIZKs "inside the ciphertexts". Second, we suggest two notions of "extractable hash function" that are more natural and milder than the assumption of Di Crescenzo and Lipmaa but still allow succinct arguments.
Based on these techniques we present a two-party protocol that computes any PPT functionality f with UC security in the presence of malicious adversaries. Our protocol is the first to additionally achieve the following strong properties: Polylogarithmic communication complexity in the size of the circuit C that computes f . One round complexity, i.e., a single message in each direction assuming an appropriate trusted setup. We prove our protocol in the common reference string model. Polylogarithmic workload in the size of the circuit C that computes f , for one of the parties.
Our protocol is based on fully homomorphic encryption, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and the existence of extractable hash functions. While the first two notions are fairly standard, we explain in more detail the new notions of extractability:
The first extractability assumption (EHF1) considers a collision intracable hash function H mapping into a small subset of a large domain and essentially asserts that the only way to generate an element in Im(H) is to compute the function on a given input. More precisely, we require that for every adversary outputting a value h there exists an efficient extractor that (given the same randomness) outputs a preimage of h, whenever h ∈ Im(H). We propose an instantiation of EHF1-extractable and collision intractable hash functions based on a knowledge of exponent assumption (Damgård [Dam91] ) in Z * N where N is an RSA modulus.
The second extractability assumption (EHF2) makes a weaker demand on the hash function H: again we require that for each adversary outputting h, there exists an extractor that tries to find a preimage. This time, however, the extractor is allowed to fail even if h ∈ Im(H). The demand, however, is that if the extractor fails, the adversary cannot find a preimage either, even if he continues his computation with fresh randomness and auxiliary data that was not known to the extractor.
It is easy to verify that EHF1 implies EHF2: under EHF1, the extractor only fails if it is impossible to find a preimage. The more interesting direction is whether EHF2 implies EHF1. In the concurrent and independent work of Bitansky et al. [BCCT11] , the consider a variant of EHF1 where the hash function has a stronger notion of collision intractability, so-called proximity collision resistance. They then show that proximity EHF1 is equivalent to proximity EHF2 and furthermore existence of such functions is equivalent to the existence of non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs). Whether our EHF2 notion implies EHF1 is an interesting open question.
Note that EHF2 is true in the random oracle model, where we let the random oracle play the role of H. In this case it is easy to see that no matter how the adversary produces a string h, there are only two cases: either h was output by the random oracle or not. In the former case a preimage is easy to extract, in the latter case no one can produce a preimage except with negligible probability. So the extractor can safely fail in this case.
Finally, it is interesting to note that EHF2 opens the possibility to use many more candidate hash functions, whereas previously only rather slow functions based number theoretic assumptions seemed to apply. This is because standard hash functions such as SHA (are throught to) behave similarly to a random oracle, and such a function does not satisfy EHF1. However, using, e.g., the random oracle preserving EMD transform from [BR06] , one gets interesting candidates for efficient functions satisfying EHF2.
We wish to warn the reader that extractability assumptions are regarded as controversial by some; on the other hand such assumptions have recently been studied quite intensively [BP04, CL08, Gro10b, BCCT11, GLR11] . Moreover, Gentry and Wichs [GW11] have recently shown that SNARGs cannot be shown secure via a black-box reduction to a falsifiable assumption [Nao03] . Even more to the point, as mention above, [BCCT11] , shown that existence of SNARGs that are also proofs of knowledge imply existence of extractable hash functions. This seems to suggest that non-standard assumptions such as knowledge of exponent may be necessary in this setting. Finally, as we pointed out above, the EHF2 assumption is true in the random oracle model and is implied only by the fact that one must call the oracle to get a valid output. In other words, we only use one of the many "magic properties" that the random oracle model has, and this particular one is in fact satisfied in the standard model, if our assumption holds. Therefore, we believe that the assumption on extractable hash functions should be regarded as much less controversial than using the random oracle model.
Applications. Our construction is useful for various settings. We briefly describe some of these applications here, for further details see Section 5.
1. NON-INTERACTIVE SECURE COMPUTATION. In the non-interactive setting a receiver wishes to publish an encryption of its secret input x so that any other sender, holding a secret input y, will be able to obliviously evaluate f (x, y) and reveal it to the receiver. This problem is useful for many web applications in which a server publishes its information and many clients respond back. A recent work by Ishai et al.
[IKO + 11] presents the first general protocol in this model with only black-box calls to a pseudorandom generator (PRG). In contrast, our protocol makes non black-box use of the fully homomorphic encryption but only requires polylogarithmic communication complexity.
2. SERVER-AIDED SECURE COMPUTATION. In the server-aided setting there is an untrusted server S in addition to the two parties who wish to evaluate functionality f . This server does not have any input/output with respect to the computation computing f and is computationally stronger than the other two parties. The goal in this setting is to design protocols that minimize the computation overhead of the parties and instead, rely on the extended resources of the server. The main motivation for this setting is cloud computing. The server-aided setting has been considered previously in the literature [FKN94, IK97, NPS99, BCD + 09], but these works either consider restricted class of functionalities or do not improve the overhead of the clients. Our construction can be easily modified to obtain server-aided computation.
3. DELEGATABLE COMPUTATION. In this setting, a computationally weak client wishes to outsource its computation to a more powerful server, with the aim that the server performs this computation privately and correctly. An important requirement in this scenario is that the amount of work put by the client in order to verify the correctness of the computation is substantially smaller than running this computation by itself. It is also important that the overall amount of work invested by the server grows linearly with the original computation. Lately, the problem has received a lot of attention; see [AIK10, CKV10, GGP10, BGV11] for just a few examples. Our construction implies delegatable computation and can be simplified here because P 1 (the client) is usually assumed to be honest, and P 2 (the server) does not contribute any input y to the computation. Therefore we do not need a setup assumption, and in contrast to earlier work, the scheme requires no expensive off-line phase and remains secure even if the server learns whether the client accepts its results.
4. SHORT NON-INTERACTIVE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [BFM88] constitute a fundamental building block in many applications such as, chosen ciphertexts secure encryption schemes [NY90, DDN00] , digital signature schemes [BW06, CGS07] and leakage resilient primitives [KV09, DHLAW10] . Much of the recent work in this area has concentrated in designing generic short proofs (or arguments) so that the size of the proof grows linearly with the size of the witness [Gen09] or sub-linearly with the circuit-size used for verification [GOS06b, GOS06a, Gro09, Gro10b, Gro10a] . None of these proofs, however, is a proof of knowledge (a notable different example is the construction in [BCCT11] that relies on PCP of knowledge). Our construction implies non-interactive zero-knowledge with the benefits that (i) the proof size is polylogarithmic in the verification code for L and (ii) the construction is a proof of knowledge as well.
Concurrent Related Work
In recent work that is independent from and concurrent with ours, Bitanski et al [BCCT11] and Goldwasser et al. [GLR11] both define notions of extractable hash function that are technically slightly different from our EHF1 notion, but similar in spirit. They each propose instantiations different from ours. They then build SNARGs based on this assumption, and [BCCT11] also build SNARGs that are in addition proofs of knowledge (SNARK's), and show the very interesting result that SNARKs imply (their notion of) extractable hash functions. Privacy for the prover is not considered in [GLR11] . In [BCCT11] zero-knowledge SNARKs and secure computation based on this. They consider only stand-alone rather than UC security as we do, on the other hand they obtain a protocol whose communication complexity does not depend on the input of one of the parties. Some recent related work on secure computing should also be mentioned: in [MSas11] show a multiparty computation protocol based on FHE with small communication and round complexity. This construction, however, is only for the honest majority setting and does not allow shifting most of the work to one player. For a general study of multiparty computation with minimal round complexity, see [KK07, IKP10] .
Notations and Definitions
In this section, we review standard notations. We denote the security parameter by n and adopt the convention whereby a machine is said to run in polynomial-time if its number of steps is polynomial in its security parameter. For convenient we use a single security parameter for all our primitives and proofs. A function µ(·) is negligible if for every polynomial p(·) there exists a value N such that for all n > N it holds that µ(n) < 1 p(n) . For an integer t, we denote by [t] the set {1, . . . , t}, and by {0, 1} <t the set of all binary strings of length at most t − 1. If X is a random variable then we write x ← X for the value that the random variable takes when sampled according to the distribution of X. If A is a probabilistic algorithm running on input z, then we write x ← A(z) for the output of A when run on input z. 
Public Key Encryption Schemes
We specify the standard definitions of public key encryption scheme and semantic security.
Definition 2.2 (PKE)
We say that Π E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is a public key encryption scheme (PKE) if KeyGen, Enc, Dec are algorithms specified as follows.
• KeyGen, given a security parameter n (in unary), outputs keys (pk, sk), where pk is a public key and sk is a secret key. We denote this by (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 n ).
• 
• Semantic security game Exp
Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
We define fully homomorphic encryption and additional desired properties. We will say that a bit string pk is a well-formed public key, if it can be generated as output from the KeyGen algorithm on input the security parameter and a set of random coins in the range specified for the key generation algorithm. Similarly, a bit string c is a well-formed ciphertext if c = Enc pk (m; r) for message m and random coins r is the range specified for the encryption algorithm. We further require the existence of a refresh algorithm Refresh so that for well-formed pk, c 1 , ..., c ℓ , the following distributions are statistically close,
Typically, Refresh is defined by running Eval again with ciphertext Eval pk (C, c 1 , . . . , c ℓ ), an appropriately chosen encryption of zero and an addition gate. The idea is that the randomness for the encryption of zero is chosen large enough to "drown" the randomness coming from the original encryptions. We need that Refresh is correct, in the sense that on input well-formed pk, c 1 , ..., c ℓ as above, it outputs with probability 1 a ciphertext that decrypts to C(m 1 , . . . , m ℓ ). We also require that Π E is semantically secure. Finally, we note that we require compactness in the sense that the output of Eval is upper bounded by some fixed polynomial regardless of C or the input length. We note that our requirements on correctness of the Eval and Refresh algorithms are stronger than what is usually assumed by existing schemes in the literature: we want them to generate output of the expected form with probability 1 whenever the input is well-formed, whereas other definitions only require correct behavior on average over the distribution we expect the input to have. We need the stronger requirement because we need Eval and Refresh to behave correctly even on adversarially generated input where we cannot assume a particular distribution. All we can require is a ZK proof that the input is well formed. However, the stronger requirement can be assumed for all FHE schemes we are aware of [Gen09, vDGHV10, BV11a, BV11b] : typically, the key generation and encryption involves choosing randomness according to a (discrete) Gaussian distribution. Using a standard tail inequality, we can assume that randomness with the correct distribution is in some small range except with negligible probability and define well-formed public keys and ciphertexts to be those that can be produced using randomness that is in range. Since the probability of being out of range is negligible, this will not affect the security of honestly generated ciphertext, on the other hand, the guaranteed bound on the randomness will give us room to evaluate and refresh without creating incorrect results.
Efficient Probabilistic Checkable Proofs (PCP)
A PCP system Π = ⟨Prov pcp , Ver pcp ⟩ for a language L consists of two PPT algorithms: the prover Prov pcp and the verifier Ver pcp . The prover Prov pcp takes as input an instance x ∈ L and a witness w for x and computes a proof π of length ℓ := poly(|x|, |w|). The verifier Ver pcp inputs a potential member x and tries to decide whether x ∈ L given oracle access to the proof π. In this work, we are interested in PCP systems where the verifier only has non-adaptive access to the proof system. To model this, we define the PCP verifier Ver pcp as a tuple of algorithms (Ver It outputs whether to accept or reject π. We note that non-adaptivity is required due to issues raised in the security proof for the case that the party playing the role of the verifier is corrupted. The reason for that is because privacy may not hold in case of an adaptive corrupted verifier, as it can conclude some information about the proof from observing the locations from which answers to its queries are taken.
Formally, we require the following two properties to hold:
for some negligible function negl(·), where the probability is taken over the verifier's internal coins.
Notice that standard definitions of PCP systems usually require the soundness error to be smaller than 1/2. We can get a negligible soundness error by simple amplification. In this paper, we are interested in PCP's for NP languages such that the verifier accepts or rejects after using only polylog(|x|) bits of randomness and accessing only O(1) bits of π. Moreover, we are interested in efficient protocols and, hence, require that the (probabilistic) prover runs in poly(|x|, |w|) time. PCP proof systems with efficient verifiers were introduced in the seminal work of Babai, Fortnow, Levin and Szegedy [BFLS91] . More efficient candidates have for instance been proposed in [PS94, AS98, BSS05, Din07] . Most PCP systems require only a non-adaptive verifier and, hence satisfy our additional property from above.
Collision Resistant Hashing and Merkle Trees
Let in the following . Verifying the opening of m i is carried out by essentially recomputing the entire path bottom-up while comparing the final outcome (i.e., the root) to the value given at the commitment phase. For simplicity, we abuse notation and denote by path(i) both the values assigned to the nodes in the path from the root to decommitted value m i , together with the values assigned to their siblings.
In the following, we often require to talk about the value assigned to a particular node. To this end, we introduce a labeling scheme for the nodes of a tree. We denote the root of the tree by ε. For a node w ∈ {0, 1} <d , we label its left child by w0 and its right child by w1. The value that is assigned to a node with a label w is typically denoted by h w . We also consider incomplete Merkle trees. An incomplete Merkle tree is a Merkle tree where some nodes w, with |w| < d, have no leaves. We say that a (possibly incomplete) Merkle tree T with max depth d is valid if for all its nodes w with two children, we have H(h w0 ||h w1 ) = h w . We further say that a path path(i) is consistent with a Merkle tree T (or in T ) if all the values assigned to the nodes w in path(i) are also assigned to the corresponding nodes in T , i.e., h w = v w , where v w denotes the value assigned to node w in path(i).
The standard security property of a Merkle hash tree is collision resistance. Intuitively, this says that it is infeasible to efficiently find a pair (x 1 , x 2 ) so that H(x 1 ) = H(x 2 ), where H ← H n for sufficiently large n. One can show that collision resistance of {H n } n∈N carries over to the Merkle hashing. Formally,
Definition 2.6 (Collision Resistance) A family of hash functions {H n } n is collision resistant if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function negl such that for sufficiently large
where game Hash A,Hn (n) is defined as follows:
The adversary A is given H and outputs
x, x ′ .
The output of the game is 1 if and only if
x ̸ = x ′ and H(x) = H(x ′ ).
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In the following we repeat the definition of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
Definition 2.7 A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for a language L is a tuple of three PPT algorithms ⟨CRSGen, P, V⟩, such that the following properties are satisfied:
Soundness: For every PPT algorithm A there exists a negligible function
negl such that for all x / ∈ L Pr[(x, π) ← A(crs), crs ← CRSGen(1 n ) : V(crs, x, π) = 1 ] ≤ negl(n). Zero-Knowledge: there exists a PPT simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ) such that for all (x, ω) ∈ R L the distributions (i) {P (crs, x, ω)} and (ii) {S 2 (crs, x, td)} are computationally indistinguishable, where in (i) crs ← CRSGen(1 n ) and in (ii) (crs, td) ← S 1 (1 n ).
Extractable Hash Functions
In this work, we are interested in hash functions that are extractable -so-called extractable hash function (EHF). We provide two flavors of extractable hash functions. The first extractability assumption (EHF1) considers a hash function H mapping into a small subset of a large domain and essentially asserts that the only way to generate an element in Im(H) is to compute the function on a given input. More precisely, we require that for every adversary outputting a value h there exists an efficient extractor that (given the same randomness) outputs a preimage of h, whenever h ∈ Im(H). We propose later an instantiation of EHF1-extractable and collision intractable hash functions based on a knowledge of exponent assumption (Damgård [Dam91] ) in Z * N where N is an RSA modulus. We continue with the formal assumption. For simplicity, we assume that the algorithms below are keeping their state.
Definition 2.8 (Extractable hash function 1 (EHF1)) Let A and E be PPT algorithms then consider the following game:
for R and R ′ the randomness used by A and E respectively. Then the family {H n } n∈N satisfies the first extractability assumption (EHF1) if for every PPT adversary A there exists a PPT extractor E such that for any sufficiently large n ∈ N and any auxiliary information z ∈ {0, 1} *
for a negligible function negl, the probability is over the randomness of the game.
In the above definition, we require that it should be feasible to verify that a value h is in the image of H; we call this function Im(H).
The second extractability assumption (EHF2) makes a weaker demand on the hash function H: as before, we require that for each adversary outputting h, there exists an extractor that tries to find a preimage. This time, however, the extractor is allowed to fail even if h ∈ Im(H). Specifically, the demand is that if the extractor fails, the adversary cannot output a preimage either. For this definition not to be vacuous, one clearly needs that when the adversary tries to "beat" the extractor, it is given randomness/auxiliary input that is not known to the extractor. Otherwise the extractor could simulate the adversary and output whatever the adversary does. To formalize this, we assume a probabilistic algorithm G that outputs a pair (ζ, ζ ′ ), sampled from some joint distribution. ζ is given to both the adversary and the extractor, while ζ ′ is only given to the adversary later when she tries to "beat" the extractor. In our case, ζ is a public key for an encryption scheme and ζ ′ is its corresponding secret key. Notice that our demand on G is weak as G does not depend on the choice of the hash function.
Finally, we note that in [BCCT11] a simpler definition is considered, where the adversary runs an arbitrary algorithm in the last stage of the game and the extractor is required to work for any such algorithm. In particular, it must work for an adversary that knows something not known to the extractor. This is a much stronger demand that may exclude some potential constructions of extractable hash functions. 1 Definition 2.9 (Extractable hash function 2 (EHF2)) Let A and E be PPT algorithms then consider the following game:
Repeat until A halts:
Then {H n } n∈N satisfies the EHF2 assumption if for every PPT adversary A and any PPT algorithm G there exists a PPT extractor E such that for any sufficiently large n ∈ N and any auxiliary information
When we talk in the following of an extractable hash function, then we mean that it satisfies the property given in Definition 2.9, i.e., any PPT adversary has a negligible advantage in EHF2 A,G,E,Hn . Note that EHF2 is true in the random oracle model, where we let the random oracle play the role of H. In this case it is easy to see that no matter how the adversary produces a string h, there are only two cases: either h was output by the random oracle or not. In the former case a preimage is easy to extract, in the latter case no one can produce a preimage except with negligible probability. So the extractor can safely fail in this case.
It is easy to verify that EHF1 implies EHF2: under EHF1, the extractor only fails if it is impossible to find a preimage.
The Knowledge of Exponent Assumption
The knowledge of exponent assumption proposed by Damgård [Dam91] was previously used in designing 3-round zero-knowledge proofs [HT98] , plaintext-aware encryption [BP04, Den06] and more. It was originally defined with respect to prime order groups; here we consider its variant for composite order groups. Say N is a product of two safe primes p = 2p ′ + 1 and q = 2q ′ + 1, we will then use the group of so-called signed quadratic residues QR N is isomorphic to the group of quadratic residues mod N and so has order p ′ q ′ , and has the nice property that membership in QR + N is easy to check. We let g, g ′ be generators for QR + N where g ′ = g x and x is picked at random from Z * p ′ q ′ . Informally, the assumption says that for any PPT algorithm A(N, g, g ′ ) that outputs h, h ′ such that h = g y and h ′ = g xy there exists an extractor E such that (h, h ′ , y) ← E(N, g, g ′ ) with overwhelming probability.
We use the notation of [BP04] which defines a game with an adversary A, interacting with an extractor E, that is required to find the discrete logarithm of the element queried by the adversary. Bellare et al. [BP04] distinct two assumptions based on the number of queries the adversary submits to the extractor. Their first formalization is for an assumption in which the adversary queries the oracle extractor only once. In a second assumption, they considered an extended variant in which the adversary queries its oracle multiple times adaptively. Here we focus on their extended variant and adapt it for composite order groups.
Let (p, q, g) ← G(1 n ) be an algorithm that given a security parameter n, returns two safe primes and a generator g for the quadratic residues subgroup. Then define the knowledge of exponent assumption as follows.
Definition 2.10 (Knowledge of exponent (KOE) assumption) Let A and E be PPT algorithms then consider the following game: 
for some negligible function negl, where the probability is over the randomness of the experiment.
Extractable hash function based on factoring and KOE. Based on the knowledge of exponent assumption, we can construct an extractable hash function according to Definition 2.8. Moreover, under the factoring assumption our construction is collision resistant. The public parameters of our family of hash functions are a composite N which is the product of two safe primes p = 2p ′ + 1 and q = 2q ′ + 1 and two generators g, h for QR + N . For some concrete N, p, q, g, h, we compute the hash function on some input z as H(z) = (g z mod N, h z mod N ). Collision resistance follows from factoring, since for every
one knows x such that h = g x mod N , then one can check membership of a pair (a, b) in the image of H by checking whether a ∈ QR + N and a x mod N = b. Finally we note that H is an EHF1, which follows from the knowledge of exponent assumption.
Two-party Secure Computation
Even though we claim UC security, we use for simplicity the simpler definition below. However, the simulator we construct for our protocol is straight-line (i.e., never rewinds the adversary) and uses only black-box access to the adversary, in particular we do not need to use extractability in the simulation, this is only used in the reduction showing that the simulator works. Therefore, to show UC security, one uses the same simulator and reduction, replacing everywhere our adversary by the environment.
A two-party protocol problem is cast by specifying a random process that maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each party). We refer to such a process as a functionality and denote it f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * , where f = (f 1 , f 2 ). That is, for every pair of inputs (x, y), the output-vector is a random variable (f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y) ranging over pairs of strings where P 0 receives f 1 (x, y) and P 1 receives f 2 (x, y). We sometimes denote such a functionality by (x, y) → (f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y)). Thus, for example, the oblivious transfer functionality is denoted by ((x 0 , x 1 ), σ) → (λ, x σ ), where (x 0 , x 1 ) is the first party's input, σ is the second party's input, and λ denotes the empty string (meaning that the first party has no output).
Adversarial behavior. Loosely speaking, the aim of a secure multiparty protocol is to protect honest parties against dishonest behavior by other parties. In this section, we outline the definition for malicious adversaries who control some subset of the parties and may instruct them to arbitrarily deviate from the specified protocol. We also consider static corruptions, meaning that the set of corrupted parties is fixed at the onset.
Security of protocols (informal).
The security of a protocol is analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in a real protocol execution to what it can do in an ideal scenario that is secure by definition. This is formalized by considering an ideal computation involving an incorruptible trusted third party to whom the parties send their inputs. The trusted party computes the functionality on the inputs and returns to each party its respective output. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure if any adversary interacting in the real protocol (where no trusted third party exists) can do no more harm than if it was involved in the above-described ideal computation. One technical detail that arises when considering the setting of no honest majority is that it is impossible to achieve fairness or guaranteed output delivery [Cle86] . That is, it is possible for the adversary to prevent the honest party from receiving outputs. Furthermore, it may even be possible for the adversary to receive output while the honest party does not. We consider malicious adversaries and static corruptions in this paper.
Execution in the ideal model. In an ideal execution, the parties send their inputs to the trusted party who computes the output. An honest party just sends the input that it received whereas a corrupted party can replace its input with any other value of the same length. Since we do not consider fairness, the trusted party first sends the output of the corrupted parties to the adversary, and the adversary then decides whether the honest parties receive their (correct) outputs or an abort symbol ⊥. Let f be a two-party functionality where f = (f 1 , f 2 ), let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine, and let I ⊆ [2] be the set of corrupted parties (either P 0 is corrupted or P 1 is corrupted or neither). Then, the ideal execution of f on inputs (x, y), auxiliary input z to A and security parameter n, denoted IDEAL f,A(z),I (x, y, n), is defined as the output pair of the honest party and the adversary A from the above ideal execution.
Execution in the real model. In the real model there is no trusted third party and the parties interact directly. The adversary A sends all messages in place of the the corrupted party, and may follow an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. In contrast, the honest parties follow the instructions of the specified protocol π.
Let f be as above and let π be a two-party protocol for computing f . Furthermore, let A be a nonuniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine and let I be the set of corrupted parties. Then, the real execution of π on inputs (x, y), auxiliary input z to A and security parameter n, denoted REAL π,A(z),I (x, y, n) , is defined as the output vector of the honest parties and the adversary A from the real execution of π.
Security as emulation of a real execution in the ideal model. Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of protocols. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure party protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated by saying that adversaries in the ideal model are able to simulate executions of the real-model protocol. 
where |x| = |y|.
Secure Two-Party Computation with Low Communication
Consider two parties P 1 with input x and P 2 with input y, respectively, who wish to jointly compute a function f (x, y). Without loss if generality we only consider single-output functions and assume that only P 1 learns the output f (x, y) (the general case can be easily obtained from this special case [Gol04] but this requires additional communication). We are interested in protocols that allow P 1 and P 2 to securely compute f (x, y) in the presence of malicious adversaries that follow arbitrary behavior. Our proof of security guarantees the strongest notion of simulation based UC security [Can01] in the presence of static malicious adversaries. Moreover, we require that our protocol achieves the following strong properties: Polylogarithmic communication complexity in the circuit-size C that computes f . One round complexity, i.e., a single message in each direction assuming an appropriate trusted setup. In this work we prove our protocol in the common reference string model. Polylogarithmic workload for P 1 in the circuit-size C that computes f . We introduce our main construction step-by-step. Our starting point is a standard protocol secure against honest-but-curious adversaries for which party P 1 sends its encrypted input to party P 2 , who uses the homomorphic property to compute ciphertexts that contain that the output of the specified circuit when evaluated on P 1 's (encrypted) input and his own private input. These ciphtertexts are sent to P 1 who can decrypt and learn the result. Obviously, this solution completely breaks down against malicious attacks. So additional cryptographic tools must be used in order to ensure correct behavior of the players. We then use this protocol as a building block in our main construction, adding new tools to protect against an increasingly powerful adversary. Namely, we first show how to prove security in the presence of a corrupted P 2 and then prove simulation based security for both corruption cases. For completeness, we formally describe the standard protocol with security against honest-but-curious adversaries.
Security against Honest-But-Curious Adversaries
We begin with a standard protocol with security in the face of honest-but-curious adversaries. The main building block here is fully homomorphic encryption Π E = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Eval, Refresh).
Protocol 1 (Honest-but-curious adversaries.)
• Inputs: Input x for party P 1 and input y for party P 2 . A description of function f for both.
• The protocol:
1. P 1 (x) generates a key pair (pk comp , sk comp ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) for a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, computes e x = Enc pk comp (x) and sends (pk comp , e x ) to P 2 .
P
3. P 1 decrypts c and obtains the result of the computation f (x, y) = Dec skcomp (c).
Security of P 1 follows by the semantic security of the encryption scheme Π E . Similarly, security of P 2 follows from the ability to refresh the ciphertext sent back to P 1 so that it only encrypts the outcome. It is easy to see that the communication complexity is independent of the complexity of the circuit-size C that computes f , and only depends on its inputs and outputs lengths, and the security parameter.
Security against a Malicious P 1
We extend the above protocol and allow P 1 to be malicious (if corrupted), while P 2 remains honest-butcurious. To this end, we use standard techniques to achieve security in the malicious setting by relying on NIZK proof systems ⟨CRSGen, P, V⟩ and an idealized setup. Specifically, we let P 1 send two encryptions encrypted under two different keys (one public key for which P 1 knows the secret key and the other public key is placed in the common reference string), so that the same plaintext is encrypted. This enables the simulator to extract x using the trapdoor of the common reference string. In addition to that, P 1 must prove that its public key, together with the ciphertexts, are well-formed. Note that the statement proved below asserts that each ciphertext is produced from a message and randomness of the expected range, so it is implicitly asserted that these ciphertexts are well-formed. Nevertheless, we still need to prove wellformness of pk comp . This is essentially immediate when specifying the random coins used to generate it as part of the witness, since all it takes is to verify whether these coins are of the expected range. In order to formalize this proof we define language L as follows.
This proof is utilized in Step 1b of Protocol 2. The complete protocol follows.
Protocol 2 (Malicious P 1 .)
• Setup: Generate keys (pk x , sk x ) ← KeyGen(1 n ). Set the common reference string crs = (pk x , σ), where σ ← CRSGen(1 n ) is the common reference string used for proving membership in L.
• Input: Input x for party P 1 and input y for party P 2 . A description of function f for both.
1. First message computed by party P 1 .
(a) Setup. Generate a key pair (pk comp , sk comp ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) for a fully homomorphic encryption scheme and compute e x = Enc pk comp (x). Clearly, if both parties behave honestly P 1 learns the correct output. We state the following theorem. Intuitively, security against malicious P 1 follows from the soundness of proof π L . A simulator S 1 for an adversary corrupting P 1 can be designed by first verifying the proof π L and aborting if it is not verified correctly. Next, S 1 extracts the adversary's input x ′ using the secret key sk x . S 1 sends x ′ to the trusted party computing f and receives the outcome. It then encrypts this value and sends it back to the adversary. Security against corrupted P 2 follows from the semantic security property of Π E . Communication complexity depends only on the input/output length of f .
Security against Malicious Adversaries
In this section we present our full protocol that protects against malicious adversarial attacks. Our protocol uses Protocol 2 as a building block but adds additional tools. This essentially amounts to a SNARG allowing P 1 to verify the correctness of the output issued by P 2 . More precisely:
1. We first add a PCP system ⟨Prov pcp , (Ver 1 pcp , Ver 2 pcp )⟩ (cf. Definition 2.5), used by P 2 for proving membership in the language L 1 . Formally, L 1 is defined by
Namely, the PCP shows that if one decrypts c it gets the desired result f (x, y), where x is the plaintext contained in e x and y is the plaintext in e y . This proof is utilized in Step 2c of Protocol 3. We recall that the statement proved asserts that e y is produced from a message and randomness of the expected range so it is implicitly asserted that e y is well-formed.
We further let P 2 commit to this proof using a Merkle hash tree instantiated with an extractable collision resistance hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} τ (cf. Definition 2.9). The main problem with this is that hashing the proof does not necessarily conceal it, unless a special hiding property is required form the underlying hash function. We fix that by hashing the committed PCP instead, and then prove that the values embedded within these commitments correspond to a valid proof. pcp is independent of the strategy followed by a malicious P 1 . Furthermore, notice that the we do not explicitly need to include checks of well-formedness for the ciphertext c q 1 , . . . , c qt since these are implied by the fact that the ciphertext are possible outputs on proper inputs
This proof is utilized in Step 2f in Protocol 3. Importantly, the number of queries asked by P 1 is polylogarithmic in the PCP size (and hence in the circuit-size that computes f ).
The above implies that P 1 has to provide encryptions of the queries q 1 , . . . , q t . In order to ensure correctness of these queries, we add a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for which P 1 proves that the queries were indeed sampled from the correct range. This is formalized in Step 1c of Protocol 3 below.
An overview of our protocol. We summarize the discussion above. (1) At first, P 1 sends its input x encrypted under two distinct public keys together with the encrypted PCP queries and a proof of correct behavior. (2) P 2 then replies with ciphertexts that contain the output of the specified circuit, as generated above. It then produces a PCP for this computation and commits to it using a Merkle tree. Finally, P 2 computes ciphertexts that contain the answers for the PCP queries by opening the corresponding paths in the Merkle tree generated above (note that this step is performed obliviously within the fully homomorphic encryption scheme). P 2 sends the computation of f (x, y) and answers to PCP queries together with a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof for backing up its computations.
Intuitively, the overall communication complexity depends on the number of PCP queries, the answers to these queries and the overhead induced by the non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Recall first that PCP systems are sound even after observing only polylogarithmic bits of the proof. Moreover, each answer to such a query requires providing the corresponding path in the hashed Merkle tree of the PCP which includes logarithmic number of elements (in the proof's size). Finally, we utilize zero-knowledge proofs with communication that is polynomial in the size of the witness. All these tools ensure that the overall communication is polylogarithmic in the circuit's size.
The Complete Construction
We are now ready to present our protocol in detail.
Protocol 3 (Malicious adversaries.)
• Setup: Generate keys (pk x , sk x ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) and (pk y , sk y ) ← KeyGen(1 n ).
2 Set the common reference string crs = (pk x , pk y , σ), where σ is a joint common reference string used by P 1 for proving membership in L and by P 2 for proving membership in L 1 and L 2 . Pick an extractable collision-resistant hash function
2 We note that these public keys do not have to be associated with the fully homomorphic encryption scheme. For convenience, we assume that they do in order to avoid overload of parameters.
• The protocol: 
Proof Outline
We give a brief overview of our proof. We distinct two corruption cases. Let P 1 be controlled by an adversary A. In this case we face the difficulty of protecting the privacy of P 2 , since revealing bits from Γ so that the PCP verifier will be able to validate the proof is insecure. Loosely speaking, privacy follows due to hashing the committed proof rather than the proof itself. Thus, secrecy is obtained from the hiding property of the commitment scheme. Simulating A's view requires from the simulator to verify the correctness of the message m 1 received from A as the honest P 2 would. Then it extracts A's input, forwarding it to the trusted party. Finally, upon receiving from the trusted party f (x, y), it encrypts this value under pk comp and sends it back to A. Now, since the simulator does not use the real honest party's input, y, it cannot construct a valid proof Γ and therefore has to build the hash tree on commitments to the zero string. It further simulates the NIZK proof for L 2 . Indistinguishability follows due to: (1) Zero-knowledge property of the proof system of L 2 . (2) Semantic security of Π E . (3) Refresh algorithm of Π E that produces a ciphertext indistinguishable from a ciphertext that encrypts f (x, y) directly (without going through homomorphic evaluation). (4) Soundness of the proof system of L.
We now consider the case where P 2 is corrupt. Intuitively, security should follow from semantic security of encryptions under pk pro , soundness of the PCP and the fact that P 2 is committed to a PCP string via sending the root of the Merkle tree: by soundness of the PCP, the only way P 2 could cheat would be to look at the encrypted PCP queries and adapt the PCP string it commits to, to the specific queries that are asked. Supposedly, this is not possible by semantic security. The technical difficulty, however, is that to have P 2 help us conclude anything on which queries have been encrypted in a given ciphertext (to make a reduction to semantic security), we would need to see the responses P 2 sends back. Unfortunately, these are encrypted under the same key pk pro , and if we want to do a reduction to semantic security, we cannot know sk pro and so cannot see the responses directly. This is solved by first observing that by the extractability of the hash function, we can extract a Merkle tree T based on the root of the tree sent by P 2 , and hence also a PCP string (we can assume we know sk y so we can decrypt the commitments containing PCP bits). We then show that the encrypted paths path(q i ) must be contained in T , or else we could break extractability or collision resistance of H n . So the responses we want to see will be embedded in the tree we can extract. The reduction to semantic security can therefore ask for an encryption of one of two sets of queries ⃗ q 0 or ⃗ q 1 . It shows the ciphertext to P 2 and extracts a PCP string from the root sent by P 2 . Then if ⃗ q b leads to accept with the extracted PCP P 1 would also accept in a real execution, so we guess that ⃗ q b was the encrypted plaintext.
The Proof of Theorem 3.2
denote a random variable distributed over the outputs of parties P 1 and P 2 and an adversary A controlling one of these parties, when engaging in an execution of Protocol 3. So that the honest party returns it output from the protocol and a corrupted party outputs its view. Moreover, let
denote the corresponding random variable ranging over the parties's outputs in a simulated execution. We prove security separately in the case when P x and P y are corrupted. Thus, it should be clear from the context which party is controlled by A. For ease of notation, we omit to give explicitly the auxiliary information z as input to the algorithms, i.e., as input for the adversary and the simulator.
Party P 1 is corrupted
Let A denote an adversary controlling party P 1 . We construct a simulator S that simulates A's environment by taking the role of P 2 . More formally, S works as follows:
1. First, generate keys (pk x , sk x ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) and (pk y , sk y ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) and simulate the common reference string (σ, td) ← S 1 (1 n ) together with a trapdoor. The latter is done using the NIZK simulator S 1 from Definition 2.7. Also, pick an extractable collision-resistant hash function
2. Upon receiving (e x , e ′ x , pk comp , pk pro , π L ) and (b i , π i ), for i ∈ [t], from P 1 , it verifies the proofs π L and {π i } i∈ [t] . If verification fails, then it aborts as in the real execution of the protocol.
3. S computes x = Dec skx (e ′ x ) and sends it to the ideal functionality to obtain f (x, y). It then computes c = Enc pk comp (f (x, y) ).
4. S computes a Merkel hash root h for an incorrect PCP by computing an encryption of zero rather than the real input y. It then prepares a false instance z S pcp for language L 1 and generates ciphertexts c i = Enc pk y (0) for i ∈ [ℓ]. Finally, S simulates the NIZK proof π L 2 for the instance (z pcp , (q 1 , . . . , q t ), (c q 1 , . . . , c qt ) ) with the NIZK simulator. Notice that the simulation of the NIZK can be done since it requires to run Ver 2 pcp on the plaintexts in c q i , where the q i 's are encrypted with pk pro .
Clearly, S runs in polynomial-time. We prove now that the simulated and real views are computationally indistinguishable. Recall that the differences between the executions are as follows. First, S prepares a fake instance z pcp by encrypting zero instead of y. Then, S commits to zero rather than the correct PCP and invokes the simulator for the NIZK for L 2 . Finally, S generates a fresh encryption of f (x, y) rather than evaluating f on the encryption of x together with y. Our proof follows by a sequence of hybrid games. GAME 0 : S 0 knows y and runs against A as in the real protocol. GAME 1 : S 1 generates all values as in the last game, but instead of using crs ← CRSGen(1 n ) it runs the NIZK simulator (crs, td) ← S 1 (1 n ) to generate the crs together with a trapdoor td. When S needs to compute a NIZK proof π L 2 for the language L 2 , it uses the NIZK simulator S 2 (crs, td) to simulate the proof. Indistinguishability follows from the zero-knowledge property for the proof system of L 2 . GAME 2 : S 2 prepares an incorrect instance z S pcp for L 1 by encrypting zero instead of y under pk y . It then commits to this PCP using the same public key pk y . Indistinguishability here easily follows from semantic security of the encryption scheme under public key pk y since S never uses sk y in the simulation. , y) )) as an independent encryption using fresh randomness. Note first that since the public keys and ciphertexts produced by P 1 are shown to be well-formed by the NIZK, c contains the correct result f (x, y) except with negligible probability. Therefore indistinguishability here follows from statistical indistinguishability of the encryption scheme of a refreshed ciphertext and a newly generated and refreshed ciphertext.
GAME
4 : In this game S 4 does not know y. Instead, it is interacting with a trusted party that computes f . Specifically, S 3 extracts x by decrypting e ′ x and sends it to the trusted party. It then encrypts the reply from the trusted party under pk comp and completes the execution as before, outputting whatever the adversary does. The potential difference between games 3 and 4 is due to sending ciphertexts e x , e ′ x encrypting two different plaintexts. By the soundness of the proof for L this event only occurs with negligible probability.
Party P 2 is corrupted
Let A denote an adversary controlling party P 2 . We construct a simulator S that simulates A's environment by taking the role of P 1 . More formally, S works as follows:
Simulator S:
1. Setup. S generates keys (pk x , sk x ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) and (pk y , sk y ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) and simulates the common reference string (σ, td) ← S 1 (1 n ) together with a trapdoor. The latter is done using the NIZK simulator S 1 from Definition 2.7. Furthermore, it generates key pairs (pk comp , sk comp ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) and (pk pro , sk pro ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) as in the real protocol. Also, pick an extractable collision-resistant
Proof of Consistency.
Computes e x = Enc pk comp (0) and e ′ x = Enc pk x (0) and a NIZK π L proving that e x and e ′ x encrypt the same plaintext x. , e y , h, p q 1 , . . . , p qt , c π L 2 ), S verifies the proof encrypted in c π L 2 and the correctness of the paths path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ) with respect to the root h. If the proofs are incorrect then abort. Otherwise, S decrypts e y to obtain y and hands it to the trusted party computing f .
We now define a series of games GAME 0 to GAME 5 , and prove that for each i ∈ [0, 4] we have
Furthermore, since we show that
, Theorem 3.2 follows. We proceed with describing the games. GAME 0 : In this game, simulator S 0 obtains x from the game and simulates A's view as in the real execution of the protocol.
GAME
1 : When simulator S 1 generates the keys (pk y , sk y ) ← KeyGen(1 n ) as in the setup step, it stores the secret key sk y . It proceeds as in GAME 0 .
We proceed as in GAME 1 , but instead of computing the CRS as crs ← CRSGen(1 n ), S 2 generates the CRS by running (crs, td) ← S 1 (1 n ) of the NIZK ⟨CRSGen, P, V⟩. Furthermore, when computing the proofs π L and {π i } i∈ [t] the simulator runs the NIZK simulator S 2 instead of the real prover.
3 : S 3 proceeds as S 2 except that it computes f (x, y) and outputs it as the final result instead of using the decryption of c. More precisely, as in GAME 2 it sends the message m 1 . Then, when it receives m 2 from A it verifies the paths path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ) with respect to h and the proof π L 2 . If both checks succeed then it extracts y := Dec sky (e y ), computes f (x, y) and outputs it as the final result.
4 : Simulator S 4 proceeds as S 3 except that it sends e x = Enc pk comp (0) and e ′ x = Enc pk x (0) as part of its message m 1 to A.
5 : Here, the game does not give x to simulator S 5 . Instead, S 5 interacts with a trusted party computing f . Upon extracting y, S 5 sends it to the ideal functionality and outputs whatever the adversary does.
We now argue that for each i ∈ [0, 4] Eq. (1) holds. Observe first that the distance between GAME 0 and GAME 1 is 0, since we only make a syntactical change -namely, we store the secret key sk y as a trapdoor. Furthermore, the distance between GAME 1 and GAME 2 is at most negl(n) by the zeroknowledge property of the NIZK.
We notice that the only difference between GAME 2 and GAME 3 is that in GAME 2 the simulator outputs Dec skcomp (c), while in GAME 3 it extracts A's input and directly computes the output result f (x, y). The output is identically distributed in both games only if A does not manage to produce a proof π L 2 that is accepting for a false statement, i.e., for f (Dec skx (e x ), y) ̸ = Dec skcomp (c), where y is well defined by e y . We denote the event that A sends a message m 2 , including the proof π L 2 which is accepted even though f (Dec skx (e x ), y) ̸ = Dec skcomp (c) by bad. Below we show that there exists a negligible function negl(n) such that the probability of event bad is upper-bounded by negl(n), which bounds the distance between GAME 2 and GAME 3 to negl(n). GAME 3 and GAME 4 are negligibly close by the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme Π E . Finally, the distribution of GAME 4 and GAME 5 is identical since we only make a syntactical change by using the ideal functionality to compute f (x, y) instead of computing it by the simulator. To conclude the proof, we note that in GAME 5 simulator S 5 does not get x, hence it holds that { GAME
This proves the theorem.
Upper-Bounding Event bad in GAME 2
As described above, we let bad be the event that A sends a message m 2 , which includes a proof π L 2 and paths path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ) which are accepted by an honest verifier even though f (Dec skx (e x ), y) ̸ = Dec skcomp (c). We note that path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ) always must be correct with respect to the root h ∈ m 2 sent by the adversary, as otherwise the simulator will never accept. Hence, in the following analysis, we can ignore this check and focus on the following two relevant cases:
In the above, Γ is the PCP generated by A and q 1 , . . . , q t are the positions on which the PCP verifier Ver 1 pcp wants to read. Intuitively, we will show that if the former happens with non-negligible probability soundness of the PCP breaks down whereas, if the latter occurs with non-negligible probability soundness of the NIZK for language L 2 breaks down. Let bad 1 be the former event. Then consider the following analysis (the probabilities are taken over the randomness of GAME 2 ).
In Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5, respectively, we show that events Pr[bad 1 ] and Pr[bad|bad 1 ] are negligible (in n). Towards proving Lemma 4.4, we first prove Lemma 4.1 below, which says that for a hash function H sampled from a family of extractable collision resistant hash functions H n used in a Merkle hash tree of depth d, given only the root of this tree, the simulator in GAME 2 can extract a "good" Merkle tree T with all but negligible probability if bad occurs. Formally, we will call a tree T good with respect to root h and paths path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ) (as generated in GAME 2 ) if it satisfies the following three conditions:
1. T is a valid (possibly incomplete) Merkle tree with max-depth d and all paths path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ) are valid with respect to the root h, 2. for the value assigned to the root of T we have h = h ε , 3. each path path(q i ) is consistent with T , i.e., for each node w ∈ path(q i ), we have h w = v w , where v w denotes the value assigned to node w in path(q i ) and h w denotes the value assigned to node w in the tree T .
Intuitively, in the above, (3) says that every path path(q i ) is also a (sub)path of T . We will say that a tree T is notGood in GAME 2 , if one of the conditions (1)- (3) does not hold. The lemma below shows that if event bad occurs in GAME 2 and the underlying hash function H is sampled from a family of extractable collision resistant hash function, then there exists a PPT algorithm Ext that outputs a good tree T . Recall that if bad occurs in GAME 2 , then the adversary A in GAME 2 sends h, path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ) and a proof π L 2 for a wrong statement which are accepted by the simulator S 2 . The lemma will be used in Lemma 4.4 to argue a contradiction if bad occurs with non-negligible probability, i.e., if Pr[bad] ≥ 1/poly(n) for infinitely many n, and we letN denote this infinite set of n-values. More precisely, we have: 
where H ← H n , crs is the CRS generated in GAME 2 and m 1 is the message sent in GAME 2 by P 1 . The probability above is taken over the random coins to sample H, crs and m 1 as specified in GAME 2 , and the internal random coins of Ext A .
Proof: We will prove a stronger statement than what is required in the above lemma. Namely, it will suffice that path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ), which are sent by A in GAME 2 , are correct with respect to the root h. We denote the event that this happens by Q. Instead of conditioning on bad, we will therefor condition on the event Q. Of course, if bad occurs then also Q occurs.
For the extractor E of H n , we define the algorithm Ext A,E (crs, H, m 1 , d), which outputs a good Merkel tree T . Ext A,E (crs, H, m 1 , d) takes as input the crs, the hash function as sampled in the setup of GAME 2 and the message m 1 sent by P 1 . It then simulates A on some randomness r, which results in h as part of m 2 .
We will later use Ext E,A (crs, H, m 1 , d) in the reduction to the EHF2 assumption. The "tree" extractor specified below will take the role of the loop in the EHF2 game, where A is the adversary that attempts to break the EHF2 assumption and each call to ExtractNode corresponds to one iteration of the loop in the EHF2 game. In the reduction, the auxiliary information (ζ, ζ ′ ) will be set to ((crs, H, m 1 ), sk pro ). For further details on how the "tree" extractor Ext E,A (crs, H, m 1 , d) is used, we refer the reader to the proof of Claim 4.2.
Simulate A on internal randomness with crs and m 1 . Let h be the root sent as part of m 2 ; Call sub-routine ExtractNode(ϵ, h); Return T , where the nodes in T are assigned values h w for w ∈ T .
Since the PCP Γ to which A commits via the Merkle tree has length ℓ = poly(n), our extractor Ext E,A (crs, H, m 1 , d) has to make at most 2ℓ calls to the underlying PPT extractor E. Moreover, since A and the verification of h ∈ Im(H) can be done in polynomial time, we get that also Ext E,A runs in time polynomial in n.
To prove the lemma, it remains to show that for the above extractor Eq. (2) holds if in GAME 2 event Q occurs. In other words, we need to show that the tree T ← Ext E,A (crs, H, m 1 , d) is good, i.e., it satisfies the requirements given in (1)-(3) . Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists A and a polynomial poly(·) such that for Ext E,A as defined above, we have
for infinitely many n ∈N. Since T ← Ext E,A (crs, H, m 1 , d) always outputs a valid (possibly incomplete) Merkle tree T with root h the requirements (1) and (2) always hold. This implies that requirement (3) does not hold with non-negligible probability, which implies that there exists a path(q i ) ∈ m 1 such that at least one of the following holds:
1. there exists an internal node w in path(q i ) with H(v w0 ||v w1 ) = v w , but w has no children in T , where v w is the value assigned to node w in path(q i ).
2. there exists a node w in path(q i ) such that v w ̸ = h w , where h w is the value assigned to node w in T .
The first case is associated with the event Q 1 , while the latter is associated with event Q 2 . By the union bound, we have:
Recall that
for infinitely many n ∈N by Eq. 3. By simple calculation Eq.(4) implies that at least one of the events, Q 1 or Q 2 , occurs with probability at least ϵ/2 (conditioned on Q). The next two claims relate Pr[Q 1 |Q] (resp. Pr[Q 2 |Q]) with the advantage of breaking the extractability (resp. collision resistance) of H n . Recall that if event Q 1 occurs conditioned on Q, then intuitively there exists a path and a node w in this path that has two valid children, but the same node w in the extracted tree T has no children. 
G simulates the setup and the party P 1 exactly as specified in GAME 2 and sets (ζ, ζ ′ ) := ((crs, H, m 1 ), sk pro ). The adversary A E takes as input z and uses internal randomness R as follows:
1. Loop in the EHF2 game: Run the extractor T ← Ext E,A (crs, H, m 1 , d ) with internal randomness R to obtain a (possibly incomplete) Merkel tree T . Notice that by running Ext E,A the adversary A E takes essentially the role of A and runs the loop in the EHF2 game against the extractor E. Here, each call of the subroutine ExtractNode(w, u) corresponds to one iteration of the loop.
2. Second part of EHF2 game: A takes as input ζ ′ and outputs z A i computed as follows: for each node w visited by the extractor Ext E,A in Step 2 do one of the following: (a) if Ext E,A outputs a valid pre-image (h w0 ||h w1 ) for h w , then set i = i + 1 and z A i = (h w0 ||h w1 ), (b) else if Ext E,A does not output a pre-image, then check if one of the paths contains an internal node w such that v w = h w = H(v w0 ||v w1 ). If such a path is found, then set i = i + 1 and z A i = (v w0 ||v w1 ). Notice that this is the step where A E uses ζ ′ = sk pro as the paths are encrypted with the corresponding public key pk pro .
We now argue why A E breaks the extractability according to Definition 2.9 of H n if Pr[Q 1 |Q] ≥ ϵ/2. With probability Pr[Q 1 |Q] there exists a node w in T that has no children, but there exists a path path(q j ) such that v w = H(v w0 ||v w1 ). For this node w, A E executes Step 3b and sets z A i = (v w0 ||v w1 ) (for some i), while the underlying extractor E has failed to output a valid pre-image 3 . Recall that in this case game
which concludes the proof. Notice that it is crucial that the randomness R of A E is given as input to E when it is run as part of the tree extractor Ext E,A .
In the next claim, we show that if event Q 2 occurs with probability at least ϵ/2 (conditioned on Q), then there exists an PPT algorithm that finds a collision for H n . Recall that Q 2 occurs when there exists a node w in path(q i ) such that v w ̸ = h w . More precisely, we have the following: where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of A CR .
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 4.2 above. We construct A CR that simulates the execution of the setup and party P 1 in GAME 2 . This results into crs, H, m 1 and the internal keys of P 1 (including knowledge of sk pro ). It then runs the extractor Ext E,A on chosen randomness r which results in the tree T . Moreover, knowledge of this randomness allows to compute the paths path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ), which suffices to extract a possible collision. More precisely, A CR proceeds as follows:
1. Sample randomness r and run the extractor T ← Ext E,A (crs, H, m 1 , d) with internal randomness r to obtain a (possibly incomplete) Merkel tree T . Notice that since A CR knows r it can extract as well the paths path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ).
2. Verify if path(q 1 ), . . . , path(q t ) are valid with respect to h and abort otherwise. 3 Recall that E is run as part of the extractor Ext E,A for the Merkle tree. We now argue why the above adversary A E breaks the semantic security of the underlying encryption scheme with non-negligible probability. First, notice that when bad 1 occurs, then of course bad occurs. Hence, by Lemma 4.1 the tree T as output by the extractor Ext E,A satisfies requirements (1)-(3) with all but negligible probability. To simplify notation, we assume in the following that T is indeed a good tree and neglect conditioning on this event explicitly. We now analyze the advantage CPA − IND Π E ,A E (n) of A E in the semantic security game (specified in Definition 2.3). We consider the two cases when β = β ′ and when
This is due to soundness of the PCP. Specifically, the (false) proof Γ is independent of challenge (q
) is used in GAME 2 and thus is accepted only with negligible probability. On the other hand, we get:
This follows from the fact that if the challenge ciphertext that A E takes as input is an encryption of ⃗ q β ′ then we simulated GAME 2 . Since bad 1 occurs in this game with probability at least 1/poly(n), we get that the PCP verifier accepts Γ[q
] with probability at least 1/poly(n), which implies Eq. 6 above. It remains to bound the advantage of the adversary A E in the semantic security game. . Finally, follows from Eq. 5 and Eq. 6 above. This implies that,
for some polynomial poly ′ , which proves the lemma.
We finally prove that 
A NIZK simulates GAME 2 by taking the role of S 2 and simulating the adversary A. When event bad occurs, we have that z pcp / ∈ L 1 but S 2 (playing the role of P 1 in GAME 2 ), accepts the proof π L 2 . On the other hand by conditioning on bad 1 , we get Ver
= 0, i.e., the "augmented PCP" proof is not accepted. Hence, there must exist witness
∈ L 2 that is accepted. Since A NIZK can compute π L 2 efficiently (using the secret key sk pro ), we get that A NIZK breaks the soundness of the NIZK ⟨CRSGen, P, V⟩ with probability Pr[bad|bad 1 ] ≥ 1/poly(n). This yields a contradiction and concludes the proof.
Applications

Non-Interactive Secure Computation
In the non-interactive setting a receiver wishes to publish an encryption of its secret input x so that any other sender, holding a secret input y, will be able to obliviously evaluate f (x, y) and reveal it to the receiver. The security requirements of this modeling are that the process of computing f (x, y) should not leak any additional information about y. On the other hand, it must be ensured that f (x, y) is computed correctly with respect to a well defined input y. This problem is useful for many web applications in which a server publishes its information and many clients respond back.
We point out that our construction immediately implies non-interactive computation with security against malicious adversaries as long as the sender (when corrupted) cannot see whether the receiver approves the sender's computation or not. This is because learning this bit may disclose information about the bits locations queries of the PCP proof so that PCP soundness would not hold for future computations. Our construction has its benefits for inducing polylogarithmic communication complexity in the circuit-size that computes f and polylogarithmic overall workload for the receiver. This last property is in particularly important for this setting. Since the receiver may be required to verify many computations.
A recent work by Ishai et al.
[IKO + 11] presents the first general protocol in this model with only blackbox calls to a pseudorandom generator (PRG). The security of this protocol is proven in the malicious setting with the aim to minimize these (black box) calls so that the communication complexity is linear in the size of the circuit. Other constructions that obtain similar security level either make a non black-box use of the PRG [IPS08] or require more than a single round of communication [LP07, LP11] . In contrast, our protocol makes non black-box use of the fully homomorphic encryption but only requires polylogarithmic communication complexity and a single round.
Server-Aided Secure Computation
In the server-aided setting there is an untrusted server S in addition to the two parties who wish to evaluate functionality f . This server does not have any input/output with respect to the computation computing f and is computationally stronger than the other two parties. The goal in this setting is to design protocols that minimize the computation overhead of the parties and instead, rely on the extended resources of the server. The main motivation for this setting is cloud computing, i.e., a powerful server that provides (amongst other services) computation and storage services to a computationally weaker client. As pointed out in [?] , this setting is interesting due to practical as well as theoretical considerations.
The server-aided setting has been considered previously in the literature [FKN94, IK97, NPS99, BCD + 09], but these works either consider restricted class of functionalities or do not improve the overhead of the clients.
Our construction can be modified to obtain server-aided computation as follows.
1. First, instead of a single party playing the role of P 1 in Protocol 3, we let two parties P ′ 1 , P ′ 2 encrypt their inputs using the same public keys and send these ciphertexts to the server together with a proof of consistency (we assume that both parties know the secret key sk comp ).
2. Each ciphertext encrypting an input is accompanied by a signature for proving integrity, to prevent the server from using different inputs in its computation.
3. For simplicity assume that only P ′ 1 learns the output, so that the PCP queries can be asked by party P ′ 1 (following the instructions of P 1 from the original protocol.)
4. Finally, the server obliviously evaluates function f on these ciphertexts and proves correctness as in Protocol 3 only that the PCP for language L 1 now says that there exists a ciphertext encrypting y and a valid signature for this ciphertext, rather than y and r y .
This yields a server-aided construction for any PPT function f with polylogarithmic communication in the circuit-size that computes f . The security proof ensures that a malicious server cannot use different inputs than x and y, or compute f (x, y) incorrectly. On the other hand, corrupted P ′ 1 , P ′ 2 have to send well defined inputs. We note that our proof only holds for the non-colluding scenario, in which at most two entities from the set {P 1 , P 2 , S} are corrupted but not colluding; see a detailed definition of colluding parties in [?].
Delegatable Computation
In this setting, a computationally weak client wishes to outsource its computation to a more powerful server, with the aim that the server performs this computation privately and correctly. (This setting can be seen as a special case of the server-aided setting where there is only a single client). An important requirement in this scenario is that the amount of work put by the client in order to verify the correctness of the computation is substantially smaller than running this computation by itself. It is also important that the overall amount of work invested by the server grows linearly with the original computation.
Lately, the problem of delegatable computation has received a lot of attention; see [AIK10, CKV10, GGP10, BGV11] for just a few examples. Mainly due to increasing applications for distributed computations that are carried out by devices with different resources and computational strength. The most widely known examples are cloud computing mentioned above and smart mobile devices.
Our construction implies delegatable computation where P 2 does not contribute any input y to the computation. This only simplifies Protocol 3 since the witness for the PCP in Step 2c does not include the encryption of y; e y and randomness r y . It also means that there is no need for the server to hide the PCP, so the encryptions of PCP entries and the NIZK proof that they are correct can be dropped and the PCP bits can be used directly as leaves in the tree. So we do not need the public key pk y .
Moreover, the client (P 1 in our terminology) is usually assumed to be honest. There we we do not need the public key pk x or the encryption e ′ x in the protocol. Hence the CRS is not needed at all. An additional advantage is that, in contrast to previous work, the solution remains secure even if the server learns whether the client accepts the result. This is because each set of PCP queries is only used once. This same advantage was also achieved in independent and concurrent work by Bitanski et al [BCCT11] and Goldwasser et al. [GLR11] .
Short Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [BFM88] constitute a fundamental building block in many applications such as, chosen ciphertexts secure encryption schemes [NY90, DDN00] , digital signature schemes [BW06, CGS07] and leakage resilient primitives [KV09, DHLAW10] . Much of the recent work in this area has concentrated in designing generic short proofs (or arguments) so that the size of the proof grows linearly with the size of the witness [Gen09] or sub-linearly with the circuit-size used for verification [GOS06b, GOS06a, Gro09, Gro10b, Gro10a] . None of these proofs, however, is a proof of knowledge (a notable example is the construction in [BCCT11] that relies on PCP of knowledge).
Recalling that our construction computes any functionality with low communication, in this section we focus our attention on the zero-knowledge functionality. Formally, this functionality is defined by F ZK : ((x, (x, ω)) → (1, λ) where (x, ω) ∈ L for some NP language L and λ is the empty string. Thus, our construction immediately implies short zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for any NP language L by saying that the input x of P 1 is the joint statement and the input y of P 2 is the witness, and f corresponds to the verification code for checking whether (x, y) ∈ L. The benefits here are that (i) the proof size is polylogarithmic in the verification code for L and (ii) the construction is a proof of knowledge as well.
